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INTRODUCTION
Wall established in his opening brief that a “‘heavy burden of persuading the 
court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up 
again,’” is placed on a defendant asserting that a claim is moot due to the voluntary 
cessation of that defendant’s actions.  AOB 11, citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). Red Onion does not dispute 
that.  It only asserts that there is “no reason to believe that prison officials will 
revive the 2010 Ramadan Policy,” AB 13, without pointing to a single piece of 
evidence in the record to support this contention.  Red Onion’s conjecture is 
insufficient.  It did not even attempt to meet its heavy burden of production below, 
and thus, Wall’s request for equitable relief under the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (the “Act” or “RLUIPA”) is not moot. 
Additionally, despite Red Onion’s acknowledgement in a policy 
memorandum that it was “not appropriate to require inmates to buy something 
which is related to exercising First Amendment rights,” Red Onion still contends 
that conditioning Wall’s Ramadan participation on producing religious materials to 
prove his sincerity did not violate Wall’s Free Exercise Rights.  AB 21.  Red Onion 
attempts to justify its policy in light of the factors set forth by the Supreme Court 
in Turner v. Safley, arguing that other alternatives to the 2010 policy are not a good 
fit in the prison context, AB 28.  However, Red Onion repeatedly references the 
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fact that Wall has been able to participate in Ramadan since their policy changed to 
take a more reasonable approach to the assessment of sincerity, thus undercutting 
their argument that the 2010 policy was a legitimate method of testing sincerity.  
See e.g. AB 5, 7, 9, 12. 
The 2010 Ramadan policy’s requirement that “inmates buy something” or 
possess some specific object to prove their faith was clearly “not appropriate.”  AB 
13-14.  A reasonable official should have understood that a rule requiring only 
physical tokens of an inmate’s faith was not sufficient justification to deny Wall 
his right to participate in Ramadan.  Therefore, this Court should reverse the 
district court’s ruling and remand the case for further proceedings. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. RED ONION FAILS TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT 
THE VOLUNTARY CESSATION OF THE RAMADAN POLICY 
MOOTS WALL’S CLAIMS FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF UNDER 
THE ACT. 
A. Wall Sufficiently Asserted A Claim For Injunctive Relief And 
Both Red Onion And The District Court Address This Claim As 
If Properly Asserted. 
Despite Red Onion’s assertion to the contrary, Wall’s request for equitable 
relief is available under the Act.  Under the Act, a person “residing in or confined 
to an institution,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a), may assert a claim in a judicial 
proceeding and subsequently “obtain appropriate relief against a government.”  42 
U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a).  Appropriate relief “ordinarily includes injunctive and 
declaratory relief.”  Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 130-31 (4th Cir. 2006).
Thus, where Wall asserts a claim under RLUIPA, equitable relief in the form of 
injunctive and declaratory relief is available. 
Red Onion acknowledges Wall’s claim for declaratory relief, but asserts that 
Wall waived any claim for injunctive relief in the Amended Complaint.  AB 10.
As the Act allows for both declaratory and injunctive relief, it is irrelevant to 
mootness whether injunctive relief was properly pled.  The parties agree that Wall 
has a properly pled claim for declaratory relief under the Act. In any event, Wall 
properly pled injunctive relief.  Although the Amended Complaint does not use the 
specific term injunctive relief, the complaint clearly incorporates requests for 
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injunctive remedies.  As a pro se plaintiff, Wall is entitled to a liberal construction 
of his pleadings.  AB 10; see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).  No 
matter how “inartfully pleaded,” a pro se complaint must be held to a “less 
stringent standard” than the standard applied to complaints drafted by lawyers.  
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106).  Red 
Onion recognized the required leniency and goes on to say that, while the court 
needs not search for some unexpressed intent, the court is to rely on the meaning of 
the words used in the complaint.  AB 10. 
  The purpose of injunctive relief is to “prevent future violations.” Edwards 
v. Flowers, 460 F.2d 1191, 1192 (4th Cir. 1972).  In his complaint, Wall seeks 
relief from Red Onion’s denial of his “right to exercise [his] chosen religion by 
participating in a[n] obligatory religious service (Ramadan).”  JA32.  Wall’s claims 
center on his unlawful removal from participation in the Ramadan month of fasting 
and he specifically asks the court to find that removal unconstitutional.  JA33.  A 
fair reading of Wall’s Amended Complaint makes clear that the relief he seeks is 
injunctive in nature.  Moreover, both Red Onion and the district court interpreted 
Wall’s Amended Complaint as seeking injunctive relief.  Red Onion argued before 
the district court that Wall’s claim for injunctive relief was moot due to his 
participation in subsequent Ramadan observations.  JA80-81.  Likewise the 
District Court ruled that Wall’s claim for injunctive relief was moot and his 
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subsequent return to Red Onion too speculative to support injunctive relief.  
JA142-143.  Importantly, neither Red Onion nor the district court made any 
statement or argument to suggest that Wall failed to seek injunctive relief.  Thus, 
based on the Amended Complaint, the nature of Wall’s claims and the record 
showing that both Red Onion and the district court treated Wall as having sought 
injunctive relief, Wall’s claims for both declaratory and injunctive relief can and 
should properly be considered on remand. 
B. Wall’s Claim For Equitable Relief Is Not Moot Because Red 
Onion Has Failed To Meet Its Heavy Burden Under The 
Voluntary Cessation Doctrine. 
Wall’s move back to Red Onion makes his claim for equitable relief 
justiciable, regardless of the fact that in the interim time Red Onion may have 
changed its Ramadan policy.  Red Onion asserts that because it voluntarily ceased 
its policy Wall’s claim is moot.  In order to succeed on such an argument Red 
Onion must show “that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be 
repeated.” United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953).  Red 
Onion—the party asserting mootness—must meet “[t]he heavy burden of 
persuading the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to 
start up again.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 
167, 189 (2000) (quotations omitted); see also Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, 
Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 800-801 (4th Cir. 2001).  Red Onion’s voluntary cessation of 
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their inappropriate conduct “does not deprive a federal court of its power to 
determine the legality of the practice unless it is absolutely clear that the allegedly 
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Doe v. Kidd, 501 
F.3d 348, 354 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. 
Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)).  This rule prevents the government from 
changing its policy in order to moot litigation while leaving open the opportunity 
to change the policy back after proceedings conclude. 
Although Red Onion asserts, without any factual support in the record, that 
the latest iteration of its Ramadan policy will not be rescinded, AB 13, it fails to 
embrace or meet its burden of affirmatively supporting this assertion.  Red Onion 
bears the “heavy burden” of affirmatively showing that (1) there is no reasonable 
expectation the alleged policy or practice will recur, and (2) interim relief or events 
have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.
County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979); Friends of the Earth, 
Inc., 528 U.S. at 189.  The voluntary cessation standard helps to ensure that 
defendants will not reinstate improper policies post-litigation.  Thus, even if Red 
Onion changed its 2010 policy and subsequently provided Wall the opportunity to 
participate in Ramadan, Wall’s claims are not moot until Red Onion has satisfied 
its burden. 
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Red Onion presents no evidence to show that the 2010 Ramadan policy 
would not be reinstated.  In fact, Red Onion hardly provides any evidence that the 
2010 Ramadan policy is no longer in effect.  Instead of presenting any evidence, 
Red Onion merely refers to another case for the proposition that the 2010 Ramadan 
policy was changed. See DePaola v. Wade, No. 7:11-cv-00198-SGW-RSB (W.D. 
Va. Jan. 20, 2012), aff’d, No. 12-6803 (4th Cir. Oct. 3, 2012).  The district court 
took notice of the information presented in DePaola and concluded, based on the 
record of that case, that the 2010 Ramadan policy was rescinded in 2011.
Regardless, Red Onion has provided absolutely no evidence to show that the 
2010 Ramadan policy will not be changed again and reenacted at some point after 
litigation.  Although Red Onion states in its brief here that there is little reason to 
believe the 2010 Ramadan policy will return, AB 13, there is no factual support for 
that assertion.  Instead, Red Onion admits to a demonstrated pattern of changing its 
policies concerning Ramadan frequently, as different policies were utilized in 
2009, 2010 and again in 2011.  AB 1-2.  To meet its burden Red Onion must 
provide some admissible evidence that the policy will not be reenacted.  In other 
cases, such evidence might come in the form of an affidavit stating that the 
unconstitutional conduct will not happen again, Sossamon v. Lone Star State of 
Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2009) (Prison director affidavit stating the 
policy of denying prisoners access to religious services had ended “was sufficient” 
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to meet the heavy burden), or a showing that the unconstitutional policy had not 
been reinstated for many years, County of Los Angeles, 440 U.S. at 632 
(discriminatory civil service exam had not been used in over ten years).  On the 
contrary, when a party continues to assert the acceptability of its position, 
mootness is not found and the claim must be assessed on its merit.  Com. of Va. ex 
rel. Coleman v. Califano, 631 F.2d 324, 326-27 (4th Cir. 1980) (Virginia’s claims 
against the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare were not moot where 
the Department “continued to assert the correctness of its position.”).  In light of 
the constantly-changing policy, the lack of oversight over the policy and Red 
Onion’s assertion that the “policy as a whole was reasonable,” (AB 22), more than 
a simple affidavit likely would be required to meet Red Onion’s burden here, but 
the Court need not address what amount of evidence is required to meet the 
burden:  Red Onion presented none at all. 
Red Onion’s failure to satisfy its burden under the voluntary cessation 
doctrine is not excused because Red Onion is a government defendant.  Even if a 
government defendant has a “lighter burden,” the government still has a burden to 
make “absolutely clear” that an alleged violation cannot “reasonably be expected 
to recur.” Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 325; see also Americans United for Separation of 
Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc., 509 F.3d 406, 421 (8th Cir. 
2007)(claim was not moot where Department of Corrections, et al., failed to 
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provide “any assurance that they will not resume the prohibited conduct”).  Red 
Onion argues that a prison, like a state legislature, should only be liable under the 
voluntary cessation doctrine if it “openly announc[es] its intention to reenact” a 
formerly improper policy.  Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 112, 116 
(4th Cir. 2000).  However, a change in Red Onion’s prison policies cannot 
properly be analogized to legislative action.  Unlike a legislature, Red Onion 
officials have the ability to unilaterally change policies without significant 
procedural hurdles.  Red Onion officials are also not in the public eye or 
accountable to the public in the same fashion as legislatures.  Thus additional 
assurances beyond legislative inertia are required to ensure that a prison policy will 
not recur. 
Even if Red Onion could shift the burden to Wall, Wall has met any burden 
just on the facts provided by Red Onion.  Red Onion, attempting to shift its burden 
to Wall, states that he does not allege that the policy change was merely in 
response to litigation.  AB 13.  However it is Red Onion’s burden, not Wall’s, to 
show that the policy change was not a result of litigation.  Yet again Red Onion 
fails to present any evidence to support its assertion that the policy change was not 
related to litigation.  In any event, the circumstances surrounding the policy’s 
cessation establish that Red Onion’s actions were connected to or motivated by 
litigation.  On September 19, 2011, Red Onion filed a Motion for Protective Order 
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and Memorandum in Support of that Motion in the DePaola matter. See DePaola,
No. 7:11-cv-00198 (W.D. Va., Sept. 19, 2011), ECF No. 25.  That protective order 
sought, in part, to curtail DePaola’s discovery requests concerning his claim for 
injunctive relief. Id. at p. 2-3.  In support of their argument that DePaola’s request 
for injunctive relief was moot, Red Onion relied on its policy change to no longer 
require possession of religious items.  Id. at 3.  As Red Onion failed to present any 
evidence of this change in its motion, the Court later requested some proof that 
Red Onion’s policy had changed.  Red Onion produced an affidavit and 
memorandum showing that its policy changed on September 13, 2011, a mere 6 
days before it filed the motion seeking a protective order relying on the elimination 
of the 2010 Ramadan policy. See DePaola, No. 7:11-cv-00198 (W.D. Va., Jan 20, 
2012) ECF No. 35-1.  Additionally, the Department of Corrections’ memorandum 
itself states that the policy was changed in response to an investigation “concerning 
the management of Muslim inmates in segregation at one of our facilities, and their 
eligibility for Ramadan.” Id. at 2. It notably omits, however, any explanation for 
why this investigation was initiated.
The extremely close temporal connection to litigation and the use of that 
policy change as the justification to avoid discovery in litigation meet any burden 
of establishing that Red Onion changed its policy directly in response to litigation.  
Red Onion’s failure to produce any evidence concerning the reasons for the policy 
Appeal: 13-6355      Doc: 36            Filed: 06/27/2013      Pg: 14 of 26
 - 11 -  
change or any evidence to suggest that it was motivated by something other than 
litigation certainly fails to rise to an adequate level for Red Onion to meet its 
burden under the voluntarily cessation doctrine or to respond to evidence that Red 
Onion was motivated by litigation.  In light of the frequency of Red Onion’s policy 
changes concerning Ramadan participation, the close connection to the policy 
change and ongoing litigation challenging the policy and Red Onion’s lack of any 
evidence that that policy will not be revived, Red Onion has failed to discharge its 
heavy burden under the voluntary cessation doctrine.  Therefore, the district court’s 
finding of mootness should be reversed and Wall’s claim under the Act for 
injunctive and declaratory relief be allowed to proceed. 
II. RED ONION OFFICIALS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED 
IMMUNITY FROM WALL’S SECTION 1983 CLAIMS. 
A. Red Onion’s Policy Undisputedly Burdened Wall’s Sincerely Held 
Religious Beliefs.
Red Onion does not attempt to dispute the sincerity of Wall’s Nation of 
Islam faith or challenge that the prevention or prohibition of Wall’s observance of 
Ramadan would clearly infringe upon his sincere religious beliefs.  Instead Red 
Onion argues that because this Court and the Supreme Court have not set forth 
specific limitation as to how the Red Onion officials can inquire into Wall’s 
sincerity, there are therefore no clearly established “constitutional limits on a 
prison official’s inquiring into religious sincerity.”  AB 18.  Red Onion then argues 
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that the “lack of any governing authority” giving precise guidance on what means 
prison officials might use to screen for religious sincerity, even if there is 
persuasive authority from other Circuits demonstrating “the unreasonableness of 
defendant’s actions,” entitled the Red Onion officials to immunity.  AB 20-21.  
Thus, Red Onion essentially argues that until this Court or the Supreme Court 
prohibit a particular type of examination into a prisoner’s sincerity of belief, prison 
officials can inquire into that sincerity in any manner they elect with impunity. 
However, an official action does not lose the protection of qualified 
immunity only when the very act in question has previously been held to be 
unlawful, but also when the impropriety is reasonably apparent from the then 
existing laws. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).  “The fact that an 
exact right allegedly violated has not earlier been specifically recognized by any 
court does not prevent a determination that it was nevertheless “clearly 
established” for qualified immunity purposes.” Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 
314 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 251 (4th 
Cir. 1999) (“[T]he nonexistence of a case holding the defendant's identical conduct 
to be unlawful does not prevent the denial of qualified immunity.”).  Thus, the 
Court considers “whether a reasonable person in the official's position would have 
known that his conduct would violate that right.” Id. (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 
639).  A clearly established right is one that is “manifestly included within more 
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general applications of the core constitutional principle invoked.”  Pritchett, 973 
F.2d at 314. 
Contrary to Red Onion’s assertion, while Red Onion may inquire into the 
sincerity of a prisoners beliefs, that inquiry is not without guidance as to what 
could constitute a permissible test of those beliefs.  First, it is clearly established 
that “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or 
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”  Thomas
v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
Further, this Court has clearly indicated that an individual does not need to 
participate in all aspects of a religion in order for their belief to be sincere.
Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929, 932 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Religious observances 
need not be uniform to merit the protection of the first amendment.”).
Additionally, the question of one’s sincerity of belief is a factual inquiry, not a 
bright line legal rule. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).  Red 
Onion officials may not substantially burden Wall’s sincerely held religious belief 
by any action that “put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his 
behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 
2006) (citing Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718).  It is not permissible to assume “that lack 
of sincerity (or religiosity) with respect to one practice of a given religion means 
lack of sincerity with respect to others.” Id. at 188.
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Red Onion cannot reasonably dispute that Wall’s faith was and is sincerely 
held as demonstrated by his past successful participation in Ramadan, his inclusion 
in the Common Fare program, and his repeated requests to participate in Ramadan 
during the time at issue. See JA138-39.  Further, Wall provided clear evidence to 
the Red Onion officials that the physical objects they deemed so necessary to 
demonstrate faith were lost by the Department of Corrections during his transfer to 
Red Onion.  JA138-39.  Despite these clear indications of sincerity and with the 
legal backdrop that sincerity is a fact-specific inquiry where one is not required to 
participate in every aspects of a religion (Dettmer, 799 F.2d at 932), Red Onion 
nevertheless determined that Wall’s beliefs were not sincere.  These actions clearly 
placed additional burdens on Wall to obtain specific physical objects to prove his 
faith and unreasonably ignored this Court’s precedent on what can constitute 
sincerity.  Given all the information establishing the sincerity of his belief, even if 
Wall affirmatively elected not to have any physical relics specifically related to his 
faith, the Red Onion officials were not reasonable in concluding that he was 
insincere in his faith and preventing his observation of Ramadan. 
Wall was ultimately forced to choose between observance of faith and his 
survival.  The District Court clearly recognized the burden placed on Wall’s faith 
by Red Onion as Wall, “[f]aced with starvation and repeated sanctions for trying to 
eat during the night,” elected to eat during the day, violating his religious beliefs.  
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JA139.  Red Onion officials themselves conceded that the policy imposed a 
substantial burden on Wall’s faith.  JA78.  Therefore, Red Onion’s policy, which 
clearly imposed a substantial burden on Wall’s observation of his faith, must meet 
the four factors first articulated in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
B. The Turner Factors Show Red Onion’s Policy To Be Clearly 
Unreasonable.
Given the fact that the Turner factors are clearly established law, no 
reasonable officials should or would act in such a fashion as to obviously violate 
them.  If the Red Onion officials violated Wall’s clearly established rights as 
understood when analyzed under the Turner factors, they lose the protections of 
qualified immunity and are liable for their failure to adhere to the constitutional 
requirements laid out by the Supreme Court.  Under Turner, there first must be “a 
‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate 
governmental interest put forward to justify it.”  Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (quoting 
Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).  Second a court looks to “whether 
there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison 
inmates.” Id. at 90.  The analysis then turns to the impact the accommodation of 
the constitutional right will have on prison resources and finally, whether there are 
“ready alternatives” to the prison’s regulation or policy.  Id. at 90-91. 
While a connection might exist between requiring the production of some 
physical token of faith and the reduction of the costs of allowing inmates to 
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observe Ramadan, such a requirement is not a “logical [or] reasonable means of 
distinguishing Ramadan observers” (AB 23) who were sincere in their faith.  Such 
a policy will clearly eliminate the cost of accommodating those inmates who have 
sincere religious beliefs but are unable, for whatever reason, to produce acceptable 
physical items displaying their faith.  However, it is unreasonable to presume that 
because an inmate does not possess some acceptable religious relic they lack a 
sincere faith.  Wall provides a clear example of just how unreasonable this policy 
is in practice.  Despite the other outward manifestations of his faith, including his 
past participation in Ramadan and common fare diet, and despite the explanation 
and evidence as to why he was unable to produce any religious relics when 
demanded to do so, the Red Onion official decided “[t]hat don’t mean anything” 
and removed Wall from the Ramadan list.  JA139. 
Despite Red Onion’s assertion, Wall did not have and was refused 
“alternative means of exercising” the faithful the observation of Ramadan.  AB 25.  
As stated above, Wall attempted to demonstrate his sincerity through alternative 
means but Red Onion decided that did not mean anything unless he could produce 
some physical object to prove his sincere belief.  When Red Onion still refused to 
permit his participation in Ramadan, Wall attempted to exercise the faithful 
observance of Ramadan by saving his meals in his cell to eat it after sundown as 
the tenants of his faith required.  JA139.  Wall, however, was not only prohibited 
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from saving the food but also threatened with punishment for his attempt to 
exercise his faith through alternative means.  JA139.  Furthermore, the inmates at 
Red Onion are severely limited in the alternative means available to them to more 
broadly participate in the observations of their religious practice, including a 
prohibition on participation in group religious services.  JA138 n. 3; JA74.  Thus, 
Wall did not have and was prohibited from adequate alternative means to exercise 
his faith. 
The analysis of the third and fourth Turner factors similarly cut strongly in 
Wall’s favor.  Red Onion appears to argue that no viable alternatives to the 2010 
Ramadan policy existed and that the impact of any accommodation or change 
would be substantial.  At the same time Red Onion acknowledges that it not only 
employed a different policy with a different standard through 2009 but also 
implemented a new policy in 2011 which again applied a different standard and 
allowed a for a variety of methods to demonstrate sincerity of belief.  AB 12, 28-
30.  The argument that any alternatives or accommodations would unreasonably 
tax prison resources is simply not compelling when, as here, Red Onion has 
utilized much less restrictive alternatives and has affirmatively argued that the 
implementation of its new policy moots Walls claims.  AB 12, 28.  Moreover, as 
explained in Wall’s opening brief, Red Onion’s own guidance documents provide 
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several alternatives to Red Onion’s Ramadan policy.  AOB 20; JA88.  Red Onion 
does not respond to that point.   
It is disingenuous for Red Onion to argue that a different, more inclusive 
policy, would unreasonably burden prison resources when, at the same time, it 
argues that Wall’s argument under the Act is moot due to Red Onion’s new, less 
restrictive policy.  AB 12.  Simply accepting any or all of Wall’s ample proof of 
the sincerity of his belief, would result in no additional burdens on staff, inmates, 
or prison resources beyond the burdens Red Onion has to implement and enforce 
the new policy which allows such things to be used to demonstrate sincerity of 
belief.  Thus, it is clear that Red Onion’s policy and the implementation against 
Wall were not reasonable under Turner.
As discussed above, Wall pled facts establishing a constitutional violation 
under the Free Exercise Clause. Wall also pled sufficient facts to allow a 
reasonable fact-finder to decide that the Red Onion Officials acted intentionally in 
depriving Wall of his right to participate in Ramadan and thus supports an as 
applied challenge.  A reasonable prison official would have known that requiring 
physical items and only physical items as proof of an inmate’s faith was an 
unacceptable justification for denying Wall’s right to participate in Ramadan. 
Red Onion’s policy as applied to Wall set an unreasonably high threshold 
for proving sincerity, as it excluded even a devout inmate with (1) a recorded 
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history of observing Ramadan, (2) prior approval for a special diet to accommodate 
his faith, and (3) evidence that his belongings, including his religious belongings, 
were lost by the prison system itself.  The Red Onion officials applied their policy 
in such a way that failure to follow one practice (possessing a Quran or prayer rug) 
is used to preclude the inmate from engaging in another practice (fasting during 
Ramadan).  Then, Red Onion Officials mischaracterized Wall’s statement to make 
it appear as if he, himself elected not to participate.  Any reasonable officer would 
have known such actions were impermissible.  See Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 188 
(“Such an inmate's right to religious exercise is substantially burdened by a policy, 
like the one here, that automatically assumes that lack of sincerity (or religiosity) 
with respect to one practice means lack of sincerity with respect to others.”).  
Therefore, defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on either the 
question of mootness or their qualified immunity and the trial court ruling should 
be reversed. 
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
in defendants’ favor should be reversed and the case remanded for further 
proceedings.
Appeal: 13-6355      Doc: 36            Filed: 06/27/2013      Pg: 23 of 26
 - 20 -  
       Respectfully Submitted 
/s/ Tillman J. Breckenridge  
Tillman J. Breckenridge 
REED SMITH LLP 
1301 K Street, NW 
Suite 1100, East Tower 
Washington, D.C.  20005 
202-414-9200
tbreckenridge@reedsmith.com 
Robert M. Luck III 
REED SMITH LLP 
901 East Byrd Street 
Suite 1700 
Richmond, VA  23219 
804-344-3400
Patricia E. Roberts 
WILLIAM & MARY LAW 
SCHOOL APPELLATE AND 
SUPREME COURT CLINIC 
P.O. Box 8795 
Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795 
757-221-3821
Counsel for Appellant
Appeal: 13-6355      Doc: 36            Filed: 06/27/2013      Pg: 24 of 26
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 
28.1(e)(2) or 32(a)(7)(B) because: 
[ X ] this brief contains [4,564] words, excluding the parts of the brief 
exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii), or  
[     ] this brief uses a monospaced typeface and contains [state the number 
of] lines of text, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 
32(a)(7)(B)(iii). 
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 
32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because: 
[ X ] this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using 
[Microsoft Word 2007] in [14pt Times New Roman]; or
[     ] this brief has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using [state
name and version of word processing program] with [state number of 
characters per inch and name of type style]. 
Dated: June 27, 2013    /s/ Tillman J. Breckenridge  
Counsel for Appellant 
Appeal: 13-6355      Doc: 36            Filed: 06/27/2013      Pg: 25 of 26
CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE 
 I hereby certify that on this 27th day of June, 2013, I caused this Reply Brief 
of Appellant to be filed electronically with the Clerk of the Court using the 
CM/ECF System, which will send notice of such filing to the following registered 
CM/ECF users:
Michael H. Brady 
Earle D. Getchell, Jr. 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
900 East Main Street 
Richmond, Virginia  23219 
(804) 786-7240 
Counsel for Appellees 
 I further certify that on this 27th day of June, 2013, I caused the required 
copies of the Reply Brief of Appellant to be hand filed with the Clerk of the Court. 
       /s/ Tillman J. Breckenridge  
Counsel for Appellant 
Appeal: 13-6355      Doc: 36            Filed: 06/27/2013      Pg: 26 of 26
